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Abstract 
 
This paper uses stochastic frontier analysis to provide international evidence on the 
impact of the regulatory and supervision framework on bank efficiency. Our dataset 
consists of 2,853 observations from 615 publicly quoted commercial banks operating 
in 74 countries during the period 2000-2004. We investigate the impact of regulations 
related to the three pillars of Basel II (i.e. capital adequacy requirements, official 
supervisory power, and market discipline mechanisms), as well as restrictions on bank 
activities, on cost and profit efficiency of banks, while controlling for other country-
specific characteristics. Our results suggest that banking regulations that enhance 
market discipline and empower the supervisory power of the authorities increase both 
cost and profit efficiency of banks. In contrast, stricter capital requirements improve 
cost efficiency but reduce profit efficiency, while restrictions on bank activities have 
the opposite effect, reducing cost efficiency but improving profit efficiency.   
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1. Introduction  
As banks operate in one of the most heavily regulated environments, research in 
banking regulations and their effect on bank performance and stability has long 
attracted both theoretical and empirical interest.  At the international level, Barth et al 
(2004a) investigate the effect of a broad range of regulatory and supervisory measures 
on bank stability, development and performance, while Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) 
and Pasiouras et al. (2006) study the effect of similar measures on banks’ overall 
soundness, as measured by credit ratings. Similarly, other studies have examined the 
effect of regulations on banking sector crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; 
Beck et al., 2006a) and banks’ risk taking behaviour (Gonzalez, 2005; Laeven and 
Levine, 2006).  An issue that has received comparatively little attention, however, is 
what impact the regulatory environment has on bank efficiency, as opposed to other 
measures of bank performance. This paper seeks to address this issue by offering 
international evidence on the cost and profit efficiency of banks. 
Prior studies in the literature have sought to account for the influence of 
banking regulations as part of the environmental factors affecting bank efficiency.  
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), for example, highlight the impact of differences in 
the environmental conditions on banks’ cost efficiency, using a sample of Spanish and 
French banks. Similarly, multi-country studies that examine sources of differences in 
bank efficiency account for country-specific differences in the economic, financial or 
technological environments using aggregate measures such as market capitalization, 
GDP growth, number of banks or ATMs per population, etc. In accounting for 
regulatory influences, however, these studies have, owing to data limitations, resorted 
to use of simple proxies such as the degree of market concentration, industry average 
capital, industry average profitability, and intermediation ratios (e.g. Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Similarly, Grigorian and Manole (2002), in examining bank 
efficiency differences for the transition countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
Union, account for the influence of regulatory measures such as capital adequacy 
ratio, maximum exposure to single borrower and limits on foreign exchange open 
positions. Furthermore, a few recent studies, also focussing on transition countries, 
have used the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) index of 
banking sector reform among the environmental factors affecting bank efficiency (e.g. 
Fries and Taci, 2005).
1
 
Most recently, Pasiouras (2008) tackles the issue at the cross-country level by 
employing a broad range of regulatory and supervision measures developed by the 
World Bank (Barth et al, 2001b) to investigate the technical efficiency of banks. 
Using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Tobit regressions on a sample of 715 
banks operating in 95 countries during 2003, he finds that banks’ technical efficiency 
is positively influenced in some regressions by capital adequacy standards, powerful 
supervisory agencies and market discipline mechanisms (the latter being significant in 
all his regressions).  
The present paper provides further international evidence in relation to the 
impact of the regulatory environment by focussing on the cost and profit efficiency of 
banks. The specific regulations of concern in this paper are related to restrictions on 
banks’ activities and the three pillars of Basel II, namely capital requirements (Pillar 
1), official supervisory power (Pillar 2), and market discipline mechanisms (Pillar 3). 
While around 100 countries have stated their intention to adopt Basel II, there is an 
ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory approaches 
(Barth et al., 2005). Hence, the importance of our study lies in providing cross-
country analysis and evidence relating to some of the enduring questions about the 
impact of the new regulatory framework for the banking industry.
2
   
While the present study is related to Pasiouras (2008) in studying the impact 
of regulations on bank efficiency, it is fundamentally different in three respects. The 
first and probably the most important is that we examine the impact on cost and profit 
efficiency of banks. Cost efficiency is a wider concept than technical efficiency, since 
                                                 
1
 In addition, there are numerous other studies, focussing on individual countries, which attempt to 
account for the impact of financial regulation (or deregulation) by using dummy variables in their 
empirical specifications, while studies for the US have incorporated proxies for differences in state 
regulations. However, these studies do not explicitly focus on the impact of regulatory policies and, 
more important, they are country specific. Barth et al. (2005), reflecting on their use of an international 
database, suggest that while lessons from individual countries provide important implications for the 
formation of banking policies, information on how different countries regulate banks and what works 
best (i.e. through empirical studies) is crucial in determining appropriate policy reforms. 
2
 With regard to the practice of bank regulations and what works best, Barth et al. (2004a) quote “… 
there is no evidence: that any universal set of best practices is appropriate for promoting well-
functioning banks; that successful practices in the United States, for example, will succeed in countries 
with different institutional settings; or that detailed regulations and supervisory practices should be 
combined to produce an extensive checklist of best practices in which more checks are better than 
fewer.” (p. 206).  Acknowledging their viewpoint, our cross-country analysis appropriately focuses on 
the regulatory framework of Basel II and restrictions on bank activities, attempting to shed light on the 
impact of these mechanisms on bank efficiency.   
it refers to both technical and allocative efficiency. Profit efficiency is an even wider 
concept as it combines both costs and revenues in the measurement of efficiency.
3
 
Maudos et al. (2002) point out that the estimation of profit efficiency and its 
comparison to cost efficiency, and international efficiency comparisons are two areas 
where the available evidence on bank efficiency is very limited. Thus, our study 
contributes in bridging this gap, while at the same time provides statistical evidence of 
the association of these two efficiency measures with capital requirements, official 
supervisory power, market discipline, and restriction on bank activities. Second, we 
use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) rather than DEA. The main advantage of SFA 
over DEA is that it allows us to distinguish between inefficiency and other stochastic 
shocks in the estimation of efficiency scores (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). Finally, 
our sample is more representative as we use panel data over the period 2000-2004 
rather than cross-section data at one point in time (i.e. 2003); it has been argued that 
efficiency is better studied and modelled with panels (Coelli et al., 2005).
4
 
As noted in the introduction, our paper is also related in spirit to recent studies 
that provide international evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on 
banks’ performance (e.g. Barth et al., 2002, Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004).  In contrast 
to these studies, which mainly use financial ratios as indicators of performance, we  
measure bank efficiency using an efficient frontier technique.  Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) emphasise that efficient frontier approaches are superior when compared to 
traditional measures of performance (e.g. return on assets, cost/revenue), since they 
account simultaneously for relevant inputs and outputs of a bank, as well as for 
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 Technical efficiency (TE) indicates whether a bank uses the minimum quantity of inputs to produce 
given quantity of outputs. Allocative efficiency (AE) refers to the ability of a bank to use the optimum 
mix of inputs given their respective prices. Cost efficiency, which is the product of TE and AE, shows 
the ability of a bank to provide services without wasting resources as a result of technical or allocative 
efficiency. More detailed, cost efficiency indicates how close a bank’s cost is to what a best practice 
bank’s cost would be for producing the same outputs under the same conditions. Similarly, profit 
efficiency shows how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice bank would earn under 
the same conditions. In other words, efficiency measures how close to the minimum cost or maximum 
profit a banks is, with the minimum and maximum being determined by the best performers in the 
sample. Maudos et al. (2002) argue: “Computing profit efficiency, therefore, constitutes a more 
important source of information for bank management than the partial vision offered by analyzing cost 
efficiency” (p. 34). 
4
 The use of panel data over a cross-section provides more degrees of freedom in the estimation of the 
parameters. Furthermore, and more importantly, the use of panel data accounts for time variations in 
efficiency given the possibility that managers might learn from previous experience in the production 
process, thereby indicating that inefficiency effects would change in some persistent pattern over time. 
Finally, there may be regulatory or environmental factors that affect the performance of banks over 
time.  
differences in the input prices. Furthermore, they offer an overall objective numerical 
score and ranking that complies with an optimization mechanism.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
background discussion on the impact of regulations on bank performance. Section 3 
covers the methodological issues and data for our empirical work. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.     
 
2. Theoretical background and discussion 
In this section, we discuss some theoretical and empirical studies that examine the 
impact of Basel II type regulations on aspects of bank performance such as 
profitability, efficiency, soundness, and risk-taking. We also examine the theoretical 
implications and evidence with regard to restrictions on bank activities which, 
although not part of the new Basel framework, is another feature of efficiency 
affecting regulation that has traditionally attracted the attention of policy makers and 
researchers.  
As mentioned already, and discussed further below in more detail, bank 
efficiency measures show how efficient banks are, relative to the best-practice 
frontier, in transforming their inputs (e.g. deposits) to outputs (e.g. loans). Therefore, 
capital requirements can affect bank efficiency by influencing: (i) the quantity and 
quality of lending, (ii) the decision of banks in allocating their asset portfolios, and 
(iii) the decision of banks regarding their sources of funds (i.e. equity, deposits). For 
instance, in relation to (i), the theoretical model of Kopecky and VanHoose (2006) 
predicts that the introduction of binding regulatory capital requirements on a 
previously unregulated banking system reduces aggregate lending, while loan quality 
may either improve or worsen. With regard to the latter, Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
argue that loan quality and efficiency can be related in several ways through the “bad 
luck”, “bad management”, “skimping” and “moral hazard” hypotheses. In relation to 
(ii), VanHoose (2007) argues that stricter capital standards may influence banks in 
substituting loans with alternative forms of assets. Obviously, this could influence 
their cost and profit efficiency, because different asset portfolios will generate 
different returns, and require different resources to be managed; furthermore, despite 
potential diversification benefits, there is the question of whether banks can manage 
efficiently a portfolio of different assets. Finally, in relation to (iii), capital 
requirements may influence the decisions of banks with regard to the mix of deposits 
and equity, which bear different costs for banks. The results of Pasiouras (2008) 
indicate a positive association between capital requirements and technical efficiency, 
although this is not statistically significant in all cases. Studies that focus on other 
aspects of bank behaviour and performance generally indicate that capital 
requirements increase risk-taking (e.g. Blum, 1999), although that may happen only 
under specific circumstances (Kendall, 1992). Barth et al. (2004a) find that while 
stringent capital requirements are associated with fewer non-performing loans, capital 
stringency is not robustly linked with banking sector stability, development or bank 
performance (as measured by overhead and margin ratios) when controlling for other 
supervisory-regulatory policies. Finally, Pasiouras et al. (2006) find a negative 
relationship between capital requirements and banks’ soundness as measured by Fitch 
ratings.  
In theory, there tends to be support for both the official supervision approach 
and the private monitoring approach to bank supervision.
5
 The official supervision 
approach argues that official supervisors have the capabilities to avoid market failure 
by directly overseeing, regulating, and disciplining banks. Consequently, as Beck et 
al. (2006a) suggest, a powerful supervisor could enhance the corporate governance of 
banks, reduce corruption in bank lending, and improve the functioning of banks as 
financial intermediaries. By contrast, the private monitoring approach argues that 
powerful supervision might be related to corruption or other factors that impede bank 
operations, whereas regulations that promote market discipline through private 
monitoring from depositors, debt-holders and equity holders, will result in better 
outcomes for the banking sector. Thus, under the private monitoring empowerment 
view, we would expect that improved private governance of banks will boost their 
functioning (Levine, 2005) and consequently their efficiency. However, requirements 
for increased disclosures can also have a negative impact on efficiency due to direct 
costs of making additional disclosures, maintaining investor relations departments, 
additional time and efforts to prepare formal disclosure documents, and the release of 
sensitive information to competitors (Duarte et al., 2008).  
The empirical results in relation to the above two arguments are mixed. 
Although Barth et al. (2004a) and Levine (2005) provide evidence that only private 
monitoring has an impact on banks’ performance, Pasiouras (2008) finds that official 
                                                 
5
 Barth et al. (2004a) and Levine (2005) provide discussions of these two approaches. 
supervisory power also positively influences banks’ technical efficiency in several 
cases. Beck et al. (2006a) find that empowerment of private monitoring assists 
efficient corporate finance and has a positive effect on the integrity of bank lending in 
countries with sound legal institutions. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008) show that the 
reporting of regular and accurate financial data to regulators and market participants 
results in sounder banks; however Pasiouras et al. (2006) find a negative relationship 
between credit ratings and disclosure requirements (though this is significant only at 
the 10% level and not robust across their specifications). Finally, Barth et al. (2004a) 
indicate that there is no evidence that regulations that foster private monitoring reduce 
the likelihood of suffering major banking crises. With respect to the power of 
supervisors, evidence suggests that it is associated with higher levels of non-
performing loans (Barth et al., 2002), it can be harmful to bank development (Barth et 
al., 2003b) and it is also negatively associated with overall bank soundness (Pasiouras 
et al., 2006).   
Finally, Barth et al. (2004a) summarize several theoretical reasons for 
restricting bank activities as well as alternative reasons for allowing banks to 
participate in a broad range of activities. For example, as moral hazard encourages 
riskier behaviour, banks will have greater opportunities to increase risk if allowed to 
engage in a broader range of activities. On the other hand, fewer regulatory 
restrictions permit the utilization of economies of scale and scope, whilst also increase 
the franchise value of banks and result in a more sensible behaviour. Thus, while their 
argument suggests ambiguous predictions, empirical evidence is relied upon. To this 
end, Barth et al. (2004a) find a negative association between restrictions on bank 
activities and banking sector development and stability. Barth et al. (2001a) also 
confirm that greater regulatory restrictions on bank activities are associated with 
higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis, as well as lower banking sector 
efficiency. In contrast, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) find that stricter restrictions 
on bank activities are effective at reducing banking risk, although they argue that this 
is mitigated by higher information disclosure and auditing requirements. Lower 
restrictions on bank activities have also been associated with higher credit ratings 
(Pasiouras et al., 2006), although Pasiouras (2008) finds no significant association 
with technical efficiency.   
 
 
3.  Methodology and data 
3.1. Methodology  
We use the Battese and Coelli (1995) model that provides estimates of efficiency in a 
single-step in which firm effects are directly influenced by a number of variables.
6
 
This approach allows us to estimate a global frontier while accounting for cross-
country differences.
7
 In its general form, the cost model can be written as follows:
8
  
 
tititititi vupqCC ,,,,, );,(ln                       , ;,...,2,1 Ni  Tt ,...,2,1    (1) 
 
where: tiC , is the total cost of bank i at time t; tiq ,  is a vector of outputs; tip , denotes a 
vector of values of input prices associated with a suitable functional form;  is a 
vector of unknown scalar parameters to be estimated; sv ti,  are random errors, 
assumed to be i.i.d. and have ),0( 2vN ; su ti, are the non-negative inefficiency effects 
in the model which are assumed to be independently (but not identically) distributed, 
such that tiu , is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the ),(
2
, utimN  distribution where 
the mean is defined by: 
                                                               titi zm ,,        (2) 
 
 where tiz ,  is a )1( xM vector of observable explanatory variables that influence the 
inefficiency of bank i at time t; and is an )1(Mx vector of coefficients to be 
estimated (which would generally be expected to include an intercept parameter). The 
parameters of equations (1) and (2) are estimated in one step using maximum 
likelihood.
9
 The individual bank (in)efficiency scores are calculated from the 
estimated frontiers as CEkt= exp(ui) and PEFkt = exp(-ui), the former taking a value 
                                                 
6
 We use a single-step procedure instead of the two-step method for the following reasons: 1) predicted 
inefficiencies are only a function of environmental variables if the latter are included into the first step, 
which makes the second stage unnecessary; and 2) if the environmental variables will not be included 
in the first stage, one will obtain biased estimators of the parameters of the deterministic part of the 
frontier, resulting in biased estimators of efficiency as well (see Coelli et al., 2005). 
7
 An advantage of estimating a global frontier, instead of country-specific frontiers, is that it increases 
the number of available observations.  Furthermore, as Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue, “a frontier 
formed from the complete data set across nations would allow for a better comparison across nations, 
since the banks in each country would be compared against the same standard” (p. 187-188). 
8
 For brevity of space, we present only the cost function here, noting that, under the alternative profit 
approach, we simply replace total costs by profit before taxes as the dependent variable and change the 
sign of the inefficiency term (-uit) to estimate profit efficiency.  
9
 See Battese and Coelli (1995) and Coelli et al. (2005), for further details.  
between one and infinity and the latter between zero and one. To make our results 
comparable, however, we calculate the index of cost efficiency as follows: CEFkt= 1/ 
CEkt. Hence, in both cases our efficiency scores will be between 0 and 1 with values 
closer to 1 indicating a higher level of efficiency. 
Concerning the specification of the efficiency frontier, we follow the value 
added approach which suggests using deposits as outputs since they imply the 
creation of value added. Thus, following Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Maudos 
et al. (2002), and others, we choose the following three outputs: loans (Q1), other 
earning assets (Q2), and total deposits (i.e. customer and interbank) (Q3). 
Furthermore, consistent with most previous studies on bank efficiency we select the 
following three input prices: cost of borrowed funds (P1), calculated as the ratio of 
interest expenses to total deposits; cost of physical capital (P2), calculated by dividing 
the expenditures on plant and equipment (i.e. overhead expenses net of personnel 
expenses) by the book value of fixed assets; and cost of labour (P3), calculated by 
dividing the personnel expenses by total assets.
10
  
As mentioned above, in the case of the cost frontier model, the explanatory 
variable is bank’s total cost (TC) calculated as the summation of interest expenses and 
non-interest expenses. In the case of the profit frontier model, the variable to be 
explained is the profit before taxes (PBT). As in most previous studies, we estimate an 
alternative profit frontier that is specified in terms of input prices and output 
quantities. Berger and Mester (1997) outline a number of cases under which the 
alternative profit function may be more appropriate than the standard one. 
Furthermore, based on these arguments, Maudos et al. (2002) and Kasman and 
Yildirim (2006) point out that in international comparisons across a diverse group of 
countries and competition levels it seems more appropriate to estimate an alternative 
rather than a standard profit function.  
To account for changes in technology over time, we include year dummies in 
the frontier.
11
 Furthermore, in line with Berger and Mester (1997) among others, we 
use equity (E) to control for differences in risk preferences.
12
 Finally, we impose 
                                                 
10
 We use total assets rather than the number of employees due to several missing values for the latter. 
Our approach is consistent with several previous studies (e.g. Maudos et al., 2002). 
11
 Estimating our models with a time trend, as an alternative to including year dummies, has no impact 
on our results. These alternative estimations are available from the authors upon request.  
12
 Since a number of banks in the sample exhibit negative profits (i.e. losses), we added a constant 
value to every bank’s profit so as to make them all positive, as it is common in the literature, thus 
linear homogeneity restrictions by normalizing the dependent variables and all input 
prices by the third input price P3. As in several recent studies (e.g. Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Fries and Taci, 2005), we use the multi-product translog 
specification which results in an empirical cost frontier model of the following 
format:  
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3.1.1 Determinants of inefficiency   
To examine the impact of the regulatory variables on (in)efficiency while controlling 
for other country-specific characteristics, itm  in Equation (2) is specified as:    
DEVELCONC
FOREIGNGOVERNCLAIMSMACGDPGDPGR
INFLACTRSMDISCIPOFFPRCAPITRQmit
1211
109876
543210
   (4) 
 
where CAPITRQ, OFFPR, MDISCIP and ACTRS are the four regulatory variables; 
INFL and GDPGR control for the macroeconomic environment; MACGDP and 
CLAIMS are controls for financial development; CONC, FOREIGN, GOVERN are 
controls for market structure; and DEVEL is a dummy variable to control for the state 
of economic development. These control variables are discussed briefly below, while 
further information about the regulatory variables is provided in Appendix A. 
                                                                                                                                            
allowing natural logarithms to be taken.  We followed the same approach for equity as we had a small 
number of banks with negative equity values (see, e.g. Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007).  
CAPITRQ is an index of capital requirements, accounting for both initial and 
overall capital stringency. The former indicates whether the sources of funds counted 
as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities and 
borrowed funds, as well as whether the regulatory or supervisory authorities verify 
these sources. The latter indicates whether risk elements and value losses are 
considered while calculating the regulatory capital. CAPITRQ can take values 
between 0 and 8 with higher values indicating more stringent capital requirements.
13
 
OFFPR is a measure of the power of the supervisory agencies. It is calculated 
on the basis of the answers to 14 questions indicating the extent to which supervisors 
can change the internal organizational structure of the bank and/or take specific 
disciplinary action against bank management and directors, shareholders, and bank 
auditors.  
MDISCIP is an indicator of market discipline that takes values between 0 and 
8 with higher values indicating higher disclosure requirements and more incentives to 
increase private monitoring. For example, MDISCIP indicates among others whether 
subordinated debt is allowable or required as part of capital, whether banks must 
disclose their off-balance sheet items and their risk management procedures to the 
public, whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement 
while loan is non-performing, and whether there is an explicit deposit insurance 
protection system.  
ACTRS indicates the level of restrictions on banks’ activities. It can take 
values between 0 and 4 with higher values indicating higher restrictions. It is 
determined by considering whether securities, insurance, real estate activities, and 
ownership of non-financial firms is unrestricted (=1), permitted (=2), restricted (=3) 
or prohibited (=4). We construct an overall index by calculating the average value 
over all four activities.  
                                                 
13
 For the construction of the capital requirements (CAPITRQ), power of supervisory agencies 
(OFFPR) and market discipline (MDISC) indices, we use the summation of the 0/1 quantified answers 
as in Barth et al. (2001b), Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Pasiouras 
(2008). An alternative would be to use the principal component approach as in Levine (2005b). Barth 
et al. (2004a) have followed both approaches. They mention that the drawback of using the summation 
for the construction of the index is that it assigns equal weight to each of the questions, whereas the 
first principal component has the disadvantage of being less transparent in how a change in the 
response to a question changes the index. They confirm “all this paper’s conclusions using both 
methods” (p. 218), implying that there are no significant differences in the results, although they report 
only the results using the principal component method. 
INFL is the annual inflation rate, and GDPGR is the real GDP growth. Both of 
these are used to control for the macroeconomic environment, as in Maudos et al. 
(2002), Kasman and Yildirim (2006) and Pasiouras (2008). CLAIMS is the ratio of 
bank claims to the private sector to GDP, which serves as an indicator of activity in 
the banking sector, while MACGDP is a measure of stock market size, calculated as 
the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Same or similar measures have been 
used in other studies (e.g. Barth et al., 2003a, Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Pasiouras, 
2008). Also, following previous studies that focus on banks’ performance (Barth et 
al., 2004a; Fries and Taci, 2005; Pasiouras, 2008), we control for cross-country 
differences in the national structure and competitive conditions of the banking sector, 
using the following measures: (i) the percentage of foreign-owned banks operating in 
the market, FOREIGN; (ii) the percentage government-owned banks operating in the 
market, GOVERN; and (iii) the percentage of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks relative to the total assets of the commercial banking sector within 
the country, CONC.  Finally, DEVEL is a dummy variable that takes the value one for 
developed countries and zero for developing countries.  
 
3.2 Data 
We construct our sample by considering all the publicly quoted commercial banks in 
the Bankscope database, giving a total of 1,008 banks from 113 countries.
14
 We 
exclude: (i) banks from countries not included in the World Bank (WB) database on 
regulations and supervision (Barth et al., 2001b, 2006); (ii) banks for which other 
country-specific variables are not available; (iii) bank-year observations for which at 
least one of the bank-specific variables is zero or missing. Our final sample consists 
of 615 banks from 74 countries, for which complete data for at least one year are 
available between 2000 and 2004. This results in an unbalanced dataset of 2,853 
bank-year observations.  
All bank-specific data were obtained from Bankscope and were converted to 
US dollars. Furthermore, we expressed the data in real (1995) terms using individual 
country GDP deflators. Data for country-specific variables were collected from the 
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 We focus on publicly quoted banks because, as mentioned in Laeven and Levine (2006), it enhances 
comparability across countries. Furthermore, focusing on commercial banks allows us to examine a 
more homogenous sample in terms of services, and consequently inputs and outputs. Finally, it is more 
appropriate to use the sample for this type of banks since, as mentioned in Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2004), the regulatory data of the WB database are for commercial banks. 
WB databases, the Global Market Information Database (GMID) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Specifically, data for the regulatory and supervisory variables 
(CAPITRQ, OFFPR, MDISCIP, ACTRS) and two market structure variables 
(FOREIGN, GOVERN) were obtained from the Barth et al. (2001b, 2006) WB 
database
15
, for CONC from the updated version of the WB database on financial 
development and structure (Beck et al., 2006b). Data for the indicators of 
macroeconomic (GDPGR, INFL) and financial development (CLAIMS, MACGDP) 
were obtained from GMID. Finally, information for the classification of the countries 
as developed or developing was obtained from the IMF. Tables 1 and 2 present the 
mean values for bank-specific and country-specific variables respectively.  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Around Here] 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Efficiency scores  
Table 3 presents the estimates of the efficiency scores for the cost and profit frontier 
models, showing the results by year (Panel A) and geographical region (Panel B). 
  
[Insert Table 3 Around Here] 
 
The full sample overall mean cost efficiency score equals 0.8789, while that of 
profit efficiency is 0.7679. Thus, the average bank could reduce its costs by 12.11%, 
and improve its profits by 23.21% to match its performance with the most efficient 
bank. Thus the results show that, on average, banks experienced much higher profit 
inefficiency than cost inefficiency, confirming the findings of previous studies (e.g. 
Maudos et al., 2002; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007).  
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 The WB database on regulations and supervision is not available on an annual basis. The 2001 
database (Barth et al., 2001b) describes the regulatory environment for the 1998-2000 period (1999 for 
most countries) while the 2003 database (Barth et al., 2006) describes the regulatory environment at the 
end of 2002. Therefore, we used information from the 2001 database for bank observations for 2000, 
and from the 2003 database for bank observations for the period 2001-2004.  Whilst acknowledging 
this limitation, we note that other studies using these  data across a number of years have followed a 
similar approach (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirguck-Kunt et al., 2004; Fernandez 
and Gonzalez, 2005). 
Furthermore, as in Guevara and Maudos (2002), Berger and Mester (1997) 
and Rogers (1998) among others, we observe that the most cost efficient banks are not 
necessarily the most profit efficient and vice versa.
16
  Specifically, over the estimation 
period, banks had become, on average, more profit efficient but less cost efficient, 
since the efficiency scores for cost decreased each successive year from 0.8899 in 
2000 to 0.8685 in 2004, while those for profit increased from 0.7592 to 0.7842 over 
the same period.  Furthermore, our results reveal that geographical regions with the 
most cost efficient banks are also not the most profit efficient.
17
 This observation that 
cost efficient banks are not necessarily profit efficient is further confirmed by a 
correlation analysis of the cost and profit efficiency scores, yielding a low Pearson’s 
coefficient of 0.075. As further evidence of confirmation that profit and cost 
efficiency do not move in tandem, we also calculated, as in Rogers (1998), the 
correlation coefficient of bank rankings rather than their efficiency scores, yielding a 
Spearman’s rho of 0.019.  One explanation for the differences in the results of cost 
and profit efficiency, as pointed out by Rogers (1998), is that profit efficiency is more 
likely driven by revenues rather than costs. Consequently, we support the argument of 
Guevara and Maudos (2002) that analysis of cost efficiency alone would offer only a 
partial view of bank efficiency and it is important to analyse profit efficiency as well.      
 
 
4.2. Determinants of inefficiency  
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the influence of country-specific variables on 
bank inefficiency. Comparing the results of cost and profit efficiency, as shown in 
columns 1 and 2 respectively, we observe both similarities and differences in the 
effects of the regulatory and environmental variables on cost and profit inefficiency.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Around Here] 
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 Guevara and Maudos (2002), investigating cost and profit efficiency in EU-15, find the “other bank 
institutions” group as the most cost efficient but also the most profit inefficient. Similarly, Berger and 
Mester (1997) and Rogers (1998) show that profit efficiency of US banks is not strongly correlated 
with cost efficiency. 
17
 Of the seven regions, North America has the most cost efficient banking system (0.9407), followed 
by Australasia (0.9178), while Eastern Europe (0.8389) and Latin America and Caribbean (0.8181) 
show the lowest scores. By contrast, the two most profit efficient banking regions are Asia Pacific 
(0.8201) and Africa and Middle East (0.8010), while Latin America and Caribbean (0.5987) and North 
America (0.6433) are the least profit efficient. 
With regard to the impact of the regulatory variables, the results show that 
OFFPR and MDISCIP have a statistically significant and negative impact on both 
cost and profit inefficiency. The negative effect on inefficiency essentially implies 
that higher supervisory power and market discipline increase the cost and profit 
efficiency of banks, and is consistent with the findings of Pasiouras (2008) on 
technical efficiency. This evidence lends support to the argument of the official 
supervision approach, which suggests that powerful supervision can improve the 
corporate governance of banks, reduce corruption, and improve their functioning 
(Stigler, 1971; Beck et al., 2006a). Furthermore, it provides support for the private 
monitoring approach (i.e. market discipline) to supervision, which suggests that 
requirements related to disclosure of accurate information to the public will allow 
private agents to mitigate asymmetric information and transaction costs and monitor 
banks more effectively (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). Beck et al. (2006a) also argue that 
when market discipline is enhanced, the corruption of bank officials will be less of a 
constraint on corporate finance. Consequently, improved private governance of banks 
boosts their functioning (Levine, 2005), and potentially lead to higher cost and profit 
efficiency.
18
  
CAPITRQ also has a statistically significant and negative impact on cost 
inefficiency, implying that higher capital requirements increase the cost efficiency of 
banks. On the other hand, the positive and statistically significant impact on profit 
inefficiency suggests that higher requirements lower profit efficiency.  The increase in 
cost efficiency could be explained by two reasons. First, as suggested by Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), higher capital requirements may result in higher levels of 
bank capital, lowering the probability of financial distress and thus reducing risk 
premia on otherwise potentially costly risk management activities. Second, higher 
capital requirements increase the cost of raising bank capital, however this may be 
offset by the fact that capital does not bear interest payments (Berger and Mester, 
1997). The reduction in profit efficiency may be due to the fact that banks substitute 
                                                 
18
 While these two approaches of supervision might reflect different attitudes towards the role of the 
authorities in monitoring banks, as Levine (2005) points out, they are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and countries could adopt regulations that enhance both the disclosure of accurate 
information and the creation of powerful supervisors. Under this combined approach, as argued by 
Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), a greater quality of information provided by a system that enhances 
private monitoring through accounting and auditing requirements might boost supervisors’ abilities to 
intervene in managerial decisions in the right way and at the right time. 
 
loans with other forms of financial assets to meet stricter capital standards 
(VanHoose, 2007).  To the extent that banks switch towards less risky assets, the risk-
return hypothesis suggests lower profit efficiency.   
The effect of ACTRS, representing restrictions on banking activity, is opposite 
to that of CAPITRQ, indicating that higher (lower) restrictions lead to lower (higher) 
cost efficiency and higher (lower) profit efficiency. This is consistent with the view 
that less regulatory control allows banks to engage in a diverse set of activities and 
consolidate on scale and scope economies. However, exploitation of cost efficiencies 
may not translate to higher profit efficiency because banks may systematically fail to 
manage their diverse activities, and hence experience lower profitability (Barth et al., 
2003a).  On the other hand, banks may trade-off cost inefficiencies associated with 
higher restrictions by potentially acquiring greater expertise and specialization in 
specific market segments, and hence become more profit efficient. 
Turning to the impact of the environmental control variables, it appears that 
most results are in line with expectations. Higher inflation increases costs and reduces 
profits, and thus inflation has a statistically significant and positive impact on cost and 
profit inefficiency, as found by Kasman and Yildirim (2006). A negative effect of 
GDPGR on profit inefficiency, coupled with its positive (but insignificant) impact on 
cost inefficiency, is partially consistent with the findings of Maudos et al. (2002) who 
report that banks in expanding markets present higher levels of profit efficiency; 
however, under such expansive demand conditions, they are  less inclined to control 
expenditure and therefore become less cost efficient. Financial development, as 
measured by activity in the banking sector (CLAIMS) influences positively both cost 
and profit efficiency; and while stock market development (MACGDP) affects cost 
efficiency positively, its effect on profit efficiency is negative. These findings are 
consistent with the view that, as financial and stock markets develop, improved 
information availability increases the potential pool of borrowers, making it easier for 
banks to identify and monitor them (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999), leading to 
improved cost efficiency. On the other hand, in well-developed stock markets, firms 
tend to rely more on equity rather than bank finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999), which could potentially reduce bank revenue and lower profit efficiency.  
Considering that profits are driven more by revenues rather than costs (Rogers, 1998), 
it is not surprising that financial development has a more pronounced and varying 
effect on profit efficiency. 
Concerning the effect of other environmental variables, we find that higher 
concentration (CONC) improves both cost and profit efficiency, suggesting that banks 
in more concentrated markets are able to extract higher interest margins by offering 
lower deposit rates and higher loan rates.  A higher share of government owned banks 
(GOVERN) contributes to higher cost efficiency but lower profit efficiency. In a 
sense, the former is associated with the view that government-owned banks contribute 
to economic development and welfare improvement (Stiglitz, 1994), while the latter is  
consistent with the view that government ownership contribute to financial repression 
with negative consequences for the economy (Barth et al., 2001a).  The nominal but 
statistically significant impact of the presence of foreign banks (FOREIGN) suggests 
that a higher proportion of foreign banks has a positive impact on cost efficiency. 
Finally, the significance of the dummy variable DEVEL suggests that banks in 
developed countries are in a better position to achieve higher cost efficiency, whereas 
banks in developing countries are prone to greater profit efficiency.  In general, with 
better access to state-of-the art technology that helps reduce screening and monitoring 
costs, banks in developed countries are able to attain higher cost efficiency. However, 
banks in developing countries are traditionally in a position to earn higher margins.     
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper presents international evidence on the impact of banking regulations on the 
cost and profit efficiency of banks, complementing the study of Pasiouras (2008) who 
investigates the impact of regulations on banks’ technical efficiency. Our sample 
consists of a panel dataset of 2,853 observations from 615 publicly listed commercial 
banks operating in 74 countries, covering the period 2000-2004. Considering the 
conflicting theoretical views in the literature, the arguments on what regulations work 
best (Barth et al, 2005, 2006), and the on-going debate regarding the costs and 
benefits of Basel II, we focused on banking regulations related to the three pillars of 
Basel II (capital requirements, official supervisory power and market discipline) and 
restrictions on bank activities.   
We modelled bank efficiency using a global best-practice frontier, which not 
only increases the number of available observations but also allows one to compare 
banks across countries against the same standard (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  We 
used the Battese and Coelli (1995) model which provides estimation of efficiency 
scores where firm level effects are influenced directly by other variables. Using this 
approach, we compared banks’ cost and profit efficiency levels, and simultaneously 
investigated their response to cross-country differences in banking regulations, while 
controlling for country-level environmental characteristics such as market structure, 
financial and overall economic development, and macroeconomic conditions. 
Our results indicate that while cost efficient banks were not necessarily profit 
efficient, both cost and profit efficiency were influenced positively by higher official 
supervisory power and the requirements for disclosures and incentives that enhance 
market discipline.  Related to the second and third pillars of Basel II, these approaches 
to regulation and supervision are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and therefore 
may explain the similarity in their effects. On the one hand, greater market discipline 
associated with accurate and timely disclosures could help private agents to monitor 
banks effectively and allow powerful supervisors to intervene if necessary. On the 
other hand, powerful supervisors can enforce conditions on accurate and timely 
disclosure that facilitates proper monitoring by private agents, thus enhancing market 
discipline. Stricter capital requirements, related to the first pillar of Basel II, had a 
positive impact on cost efficiency but a negative impact on profit efficiency. A 
possible explanation for the positive cost efficiency effect is that higher capital 
requirements reduce the likelihood of financial distress and thus lower the need for 
costly risk management activities, whereas the lower profit efficiency could be 
associated with a balance sheet tilt towards more liquid, lower return assets. We 
observed the opposite result with regard to restrictions on bank activities, having a 
negative effect on cost efficiency and a positive effect on profit efficiency. This 
suggests a potential trade-off where banks sacrifice cost efficiencies from not being 
able to engage in a diverse set of activities, but exploit opportunities for greater profit 
efficiency instead.  
 Although the above findings suggest that regulations empowering official 
supervisory power and market discipline mechanisms enhance banking efficiency, the 
literature also suggests that financial deregulation increases the degree of competition 
in the market, which thereby induce banks managers to undertake imprudent risks 
(e.g. Keeley, 1990).
19
 Hence, regulations must take account of the interactions 
between competition, efficiency, and financial stability. The recurrent episodes of late 
                                                 
19According to the “moral hazard” hypothesis, undercapitalized banks will increase their risk taking.  
Although this does not establish a direct link between risk and efficiency, Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
suggest that it could magnify the effects of the “bad luck”, “bad management” and “skimping” 
hypotheses and affect efficiency.  
20th century financial crises associated with financial liberalization motivated a 
number of researchers to investigate the link between regulations and the risk-taking 
incentives of banks. Empirical research has revealed that greater protection offered by 
a country’s bank safety net (e.g. deposit insurance, bail outs, etc.) increases the risk of 
bank instability (Demirgic-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) and that prudential bank 
regulation should focus on the importance of subjecting some bank liabilities to the 
risk of loss to promote discipline and limit risk taking (Barth et al, 2006).  However, 
as Allen and Gale (2004) point out, the costs of financial crises occur infrequently, 
despite the losses being large and visible, while the costs of inefficiency are 
continuous. They argue that as regulation interacts dynamically with pervasive 
information asymmetries, the relationship between competition and stability is 
complex and multi-faced. Beck (2008) argues that while stability is inherently 
important the primary concern of policy makers should be on a regulatory framework 
to support a competitive and efficient financial market that will allocate savings to 
their best possible use and support real markets. Furthermore, the literature suggests a 
direct link between inefficiency and the risk of bank failure (Wheelock and Wilson, 
2000), and between inefficiency and problem loans, the latter being  associated with 
adverse selection problems (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Seen in the above context, 
our study highlights the importance of designing an appropriate bank regulatory and 
supervisory framework that helps maintain the efficiency (and hopefully stability) of 
banks. 
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